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Introduction

Environmental hazards are gaining relevance at an increasing pace, requiring humans to change their behaviour and decision making criteria. We had to forgo the
comforting idea that “natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope
of variability”(Milly et al., 2008). As concerns environmental hazards, responses
are typically characterised dichotomously: adaptation and/or mitigation (UNEP,
2019; IPCC, 2014), with the implementation of one not excluding the other’s. On
the one hand, humans may (and do) adapt to a changing climate, reducing their
exposure to the ensuing harm. This includes responding to abnormal hot or cold
temperatures, adopting new agricultural techniques to cope with the impoverishment of soil, creating artificial snow in ski resorts, and much more (for a broad
review on many other forms of adaptation, see Tompkins et al., 2010). On the
other hand, humans may (and do) try to take mitigation strategies, namely tackling the problem at its source and combating the causes of increased environmental
risks. Efficient water management, restoration of soil, substitution of fossil fuels
with agricultural by-products are some of the mitigation techniques currently under study for the agricultural sector (Smith et al., 2007). These strategies not only
reduce the environmental hazards for the adopter, but for all agents, thus generating a positive externality to other agents. With respect to mitigation strategies,
adaptation does not aim to reduce the problem, but rather to avoid at least part
of its adverse affects. At times, this is done at the expense of other agents, i.e.
adaptation strategies may generate negative externalities. For instance, a farmer
suffering from reduced plot productivity due to soil degradation may decide to raze
a forest area to expand her plot and compensate for her loss of income. However,
in this way she is further contributing to the problem of soil erosion and to the
general loss of regenerative capacity of the ecosystem. Another notorious instance
of maladaptation is air conditioning: by improving domestic temperature for the
user, it increases the risk of energy shortages and ultimately worsens the problem
of climate change (Lundgren and Kjellstrom, 2013). When a strategy is such that
it shifts environmental hazards to others, it postpones them for future generations
to bear, or it disproportionally affects the most vulnerable, the literature defines
it no more as adaptation, but rather as maladaptation (UNEP, 2019; Barnett and
2
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O’Neill, 2010). However, the UNEP (2019)1 stresses that every adaptation strategy that increases the opportunity cost of moving to a more sustainable alternative
is maladaptation, as it has detrimental effects on long term sustainability. We here
study the dynamics of mitigation and maladaptation, showing how global externalities lead to under-adoption of strategies of the former type and over-adoption
of the latter.
Since mitigation strategies actually reduce environmental hazards instead of
(temporarily) avoiding its effects, it is usually considered to be the most desirable
strategy (IPCC, 2014). However, there are reasons why humans did not respond
with enthusiasm to the emergence of mitigation solutions in the face of environmental hazards. Firstly, many mitigation strategies require long-term investments
to pay off, with a time scale that may exceed the average life expectancy of a
person before they become effective (Hallegatte, 2009). The incapacity of humans
to make long-term investments and their preference for the present are additional
threats to our capacity to make long-term commitments to stop environmental
degradation (Warburton et al., 2018), leading to issues of intergenerational equity
(Glotzbach and Baumgartner, 2012), which is a characterising feature of maladaptation (UNEP, 2019). We remark that the existence of mitigation solutions is not
a sufficient condition for the abatement of environmental damage. The literature
has uncovered several ways in which externalities of any type, either negative or
positive (as is the case for mitigation strategies) may undermine the achievement
of the social optimum. On the one hand, whenever an agent may transfer her
cost to protect against environmental hazards onto others, in a way that is either
anonymous or has no consequences on herself, she has little incentive to adopt a
mitigation strategy. For instance, an agent might prefer to install a substantially
cheaper air conditioning system instead of investing to enhance house insulation.
On the other hand, if a strategy actually reduces environmental risks not only for
the adopter, but also for other agents, i.e. it has a positive externality, then it may
happen that all agents wait for the others to tackle environmental degradation for
everyone, but none is willing to pay the cost for the benefit of others2 . This is
1

United Nations Environment Programme.
In an experimental setting, Hasson et al. (2010) show that agents rarely contribute to the
mitigation solution and that their contributions to a common mitigation policy are not sensitive
2
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but an instance of the well known free rider problem, which emerges from the
non-excludability of agents from the benefits of a public good (Heller and Starrett,
1976). Scholars studying these shiftable externalities highlighted that policy tools
hindering maladaptive strategies and promoting mitigation ones are desirable, e.g.
a tax on negative externalities or a subsidy on positive ones (Bird, 1987; Shaw and
Shaw, 1991; Shogren and Crocker, 1991; Geaun, 1993).
In this work, we focus on the dichotomy between maladaptation and mitigation,
studying the adoption dynamics of the related strategies. We assume that individuals from a more developed region and a less developed one have the possibility
to adopt a technology which enhances environmental quality for the adopters, but
also generates externalities on other agents. In particular, each region has a local environmental indicator which is affected by the adoption dynamics of both
regions, so that the externalities have a global effect. These externalities may be
either negative, in case of a maladaptation technology, or positive, in case of a mitigation technology. We highlight what is the underlying mechanism which leads to
over-adoption of maladaptation strategies and under-adoption of mitigation ones.
In addition, we show what are the effects on the less developed region if the maladaptation technology is such that it disproportionally burdens its population with
respect to the agents from the more developed region. The adoption dynamics is
modelled by a two population evolutionary game which employs replicator equations, so that all agents may imitate their peers in the region, if the well-being of
the latter is greater. Our analysis leads to three major conclusions: 1) when only a
maladaptive technology is available, either all agents adopt it or none, depending
on the initial distribution of strategies; 2) when only a mitigation technology is
available, the system typically reaches a state in which a part of the population
adopts the technology while the rest does not; no path dependency arises 3) if the
more developed region dumps negative externalities onto the less developed one, it
might happen the the well-being of all agents decreases. In section 2 we illustrate
our model. We then employ it to analyse the adoption dynamics of a maladaptive
technology (section 3) and of a mitigation one (section 4). Finally, in section 5 we
to the likelihood of extremely adverse events. In a somewhat similar experiment, Milinski et al.
(2006) show that reputation effects may nudge agents to contribute to a public good in an
environmental framing.

4
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elaborate on the results, draw some policy implications and sketch future research
directions.

2

The model

Let us consider two regions j = N, S. Agents from both regions can either adopt
a strategy A enhancing personal environmental quality at a cost C j or choose not
to do so (strategy N A). When all agents adopt strategy N A, the environmental
j
quality for all agents is equal to E . When agents adopt strategy A, their action
has both a public effect (P j ) on the environmental quality of all agents and a private effect (pj ) effect on themselves. As a consequence, the overall environmental
quality for agents i is described as follows:

E j + P j
t
j
Et =
E j + P j + pj
t

if i chooses strategy N A
if i chooses strategy A

where P j can take either sign. The well-being of an agent i from region j
depends on E j and on whether she incurs in the adoption cost:

ln(E j + P j )
t
j
Πi :=
j
ln(E + P j + pj ) − C D
t

if i chooses strategy N A

(1)

if i chooses strategy A

where the adoption cost C j is strictly positive. We now define the public effect
Ptj , which depends on the shares of agents xt , zt ∈ [0, 1] adopting strategy A at
time t in regions N and S, respectively. More in detail, we differentiate between
domestic and foreign effects of the adaptation technology. The former describes
the impact on a local environmental indicator of same-region adopters, whereas
the latter describes the impact of cross-region adopters. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the public effects are determined by linear functions:
PtN := −dN · xt − f N · zt

(2a)

PtS := −f S · xt − dS · zt

(2b)

5
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where parameters dj and f j measure the domestic and the foreign public effects,
respectively, for country j = N, S. They represent the public impact of adoption of
all agents on the local environmental indicator of region j, distinguished according
to the source of such impact. Domestic effects dj are caused by agents in region j
and worsen the quality of their own local environmental indicator, whereas foreign
effects f j affect the local environmental indicator of region j but are caused by
agents in the other region. We do not apply any sign restriction on the public effects, so that externalities of adoption of the environmental adaptation technology
may take either sign. When a public effect P j is positive, adoption of strategy A
by an agent carries part of its benefits over to other agents. This case qualifies
as a mitigation case, in which an agent is working for the cooperative improvement of environmental quality, or equivalently towards the abatement of pollution.
By contrast, when the public effect is negative, an agent adopting strategy A is
actually benefiting herself by worsening environmental quality for others. From
the concavity of (1), we may add that a negative public effect affects relatively
more (reduces well-being by a higher amount) the agents who are not adopting
the environment enhancing strategy A. By the definition provided by Barnett and
O’Neill (2010), this is a case of maladaptation.
In order to study the dynamics of this system, we now describe the way in which
the share of agents adopting strategy A in either country varies. We assume that if
the difference in well-being ∆Πj = ΠjA −ΠjN A between strategy A and strategy N A
is positive for region j, then the share of agents adopting the technology (either
a maladaptive or a mitigation one) in that region will increase, since it provides
higher payoffs. The opposite holds if the payoff difference is negative. Finally, if
the payoff difference equals zero, economic agents are indifferent between adopting
or not adopting the technology, so that the population shares of agents adopting
the technology keeps constant over time. Therefore, we have that:
∆ΠN (xt , zt ) R 0 ⇒ ẋ R 0

∆ΠS (xt , zt ) R 0 ⇒ ż R 0

(3)

where ẋ and ż are the time derivatives of xt and zt , respectively. Hence, in each
region the payoff difference ∆Πj (xt , zt ) in N and ∆ΠS (xt , zt ) in S has the same
sign as the time derivative of the population share that adopts the environmental
6
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adaptation technology in that region. Referring to the well-being definition (1),
we may explicit the payoff difference ∆Πj :
j

j

∆Π (xt , zt ) =

ΠjA (xt , zt )

−

ΠjN A (xt , zt )

= ln

E + pj + Ptj
j

E +

Ptj

− Cj

(4)

For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the dynamics of xt and zt is given
by the so-called “replicator dynamics”(see e.g. Weibull, 1995):
(

ẋ = x(1 − x)∆ΠN (x, z)
ż = z(1 − z)∆ΠS (x, z)

(5)

where we omitted the temporal subscript t to improve readability. Dynamics
(5) describes an adaptive process based on an imitation mechanism: every period
t, a (very) small fraction of the population changes its strategy adopting the more
remunerative one. Differently from the “classical” contexts where replicator dynamics are introduced (in which economic agents are pairwise randomly matched),
here the well-being of each agent depends on the technological choice by all agents,
in both regions, and at the same instant; that is, we analyse a population game.
Replicator dynamics may be generated by several learning mechanisms in a random matching context (see e.g. Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Schlag, 1998); however,
rationales for such dynamics can be found also in our context (see e.g. Sacco, 1994).
Sethi and Somanathan (1996) propose an application of replicator equations in a
context similar to ours.

1.1

Basic mathematical results

As the shares of agents adopting strategy A are defined in the interval [0, 1], the
dynamic system (5) is defined in the square Q:
Q = {(x, z) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1} .
We will henceforth denote with Qx=0 the side of Q along which x = 0, and with
Qx=1 the side along which x = 1. Similar interpretations apply to Qz=0 and Qz=1 .
All sides of this square are invariant; in other terms, if the pair (x, z) initially lies
7
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on one of the sides, then the whole correspondent trajectory also lies on that side.
Note that the states {(x, z) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} are always stationary
states of the dynamic system (5). In such states, only one strategy (either A
or N A) is played in each region. Other stationary states are the points of intersection between the interior of the sides Qx=0 , Qx=1 (where ẋ = 0) and the
locus ∆ΠS (x, z) = 0 (where ż = 0) and the points of intersection between the
interior of sides Qz=0 , Qz=1 (where ż = 0) and the locus ∆ΠN (x, z) = 0 (where
ẋ = 0). In such stationary states, there is a region in which both available strategies are played by a positive share of agents, while in the other region all agents
choose the same strategy. In addition, the point in the interior of Q where the
loci ∆ΠN (x, z) = 0 and ∆ΠS (x, z) = 0 meet are other possible stationary states.
In such points, both strategies are adopted by a positive share of agents in both
regions. Finally, we find that the loci ẋ = 0 and ż = 0 are respectively represented
by the lines:
N

pN
dN
E
 − Nx
z = N − N CN
f
f
f e −1

(6a)

S

pS
fS
E
 − Sx
z = S − S CS
d
d
d e −1

(6b)

j

where we recall that eC − 1 > 0. This is obtained by substituting the public
effects (2) into the well-being differential (4). Note that the slope of (6a) is negative
if the domestic effect dN and the foreign effect f N in N have the same sign, whereas
the slope of (6b) is negative if the domestic effect dS and the foreign effect f S in
S have the same sign. Furthermore, the slope of (6a) is greater than the slope of
S
N
(6b) if fdN < fdS . Finally, we note that ∆ΠN (x, z) is positive (i.e. ẋ > 0) above
(6a) if f N > 0 (vice versa if f N < 0) and that ∆ΠS (x, z) is positive (i.e. ż > 0)
above (6b) if dS > 0 (vice versa if dS < 0). Since both (6a) and (6b) are straight
lines, there generally3 exists at most one stationary state in the interior of each
side of Q and at most one in the interior of Q. Consequently, by recalling that
3

In the unlikely circumstance that lines (6a) and (6b) have the same slope and the same
intercept, the two lines completely overlap and all their points in the interior of Q are stationary
states.

8
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all vertices are stationary states, as well, the highest number of stationary states
that can be generally observed is nine (four vertices, four points on the sides, and
an internal point).

2

Technologies with negative public effects

Let us now outline the possible scenarios the system may reach when the adaptation technology is characterised by: 1) negative public effects towards all agents
(maladaptation); 2) positive public effects towards all agents (mitigation). Other
relevant cases could be investigated, yet we restrain the analysis to these two cases
for the sake of parsimony. In this section we study the first case, in which the
adaptation technology is maladaptive, i.e. it is such that it lowers the environmental quality for all. Formally, this maladaptation technology has both a domestic
and a foreign negative public effect. One common example of such technology in
the literature is air conditioning: it provides the person with an improvement of
her environmental quality at the cost of a small deterioration of the environmental
quality (and energy security) for all other people (Deschênes and Greenstone, 2011;
Lundgren and Kjellstrom, 2013). From an analytical perspective, this translates
into all public effect parameters being strictly positive: dN , dS , f S , f N > 0.

2.1

Dynamic regimes

First of all, we note that if dN , dS , f S , f N > 0, then both lines (6a) and (6b), along
which ẋ = 0 and ż = 0, respectively, have negative slope. Above these lines, we
have that the share of agents adopting strategy A increases. In particular, ẋ > 0
above line (6a) and ż > 0 above line (6b), whereas the reverse occurs below these
lines. This is very informative with respect to the behaviour of agents: for a higher
value of x, z must be lower in order for agents in either region to be indifferent
to the maladaptation technology, or else they would all adopt strategy A. From
another perspective, for a given point (x, z) which lies on either line (6a) or (6b),
a translation to the right would destabilise the system towards full adoption by
agents in region N or S (or both), respectively. The adoption process of the
maladaptation technology is thus self-reinforcing: the higher is the proportion of
9
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agents adopting it in either group, the higher is the incentive for others to do
the same. Moreover, we note that lines (6a) and (6b) move downwards if the
autonomous environmental quality for region N or S is lower. For sufficiently low
N
S
values of E and E , we have that ẋ > 0 and ż > 0, respectively, for all points in
N
S
Q. The reverse applies when E and E are sufficiently high.
The following proposition characterises the dynamics of the system when dN ,
dS , f S , f N > 0.
Proposition 1 Under the assumption that dN , dS , f S , f N > 0, the system (5)
has the following features:
(a) Every trajectory of the system approaches a stationary state.
(b) Only the vertices of Q, i.e. the stationary states (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), can
be attractive.

2.2

Stability properties of the vertices

In order to assess the stability properties of the vertices of Q, we derive the Jacobian matrix of the system (5 evaluated at the stationary state (x, z) = (i, k),
i = 0, 1 and k = 0, 1:
(1 − 2i)∆ΠN (i, k)
0
0
(1 − 2k)∆ΠS (i, k)

!
(7)

which has the eigenvalues: (1 − 2i)∆ΠN (i, k) and (1 − 2k)∆ΠS (i, k).
The analysis of the sign of the eigenvalues allows us to illustrate the stability
properties of the stationary states (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1).
Stability of the stationary state (0, 0) In this scenario no agent adopts the
technology. In order for this non-adoption scenario to be attractive, it must be
individually convenient to adopt strategy N A in both regions. In order for this

10
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to hold, both the eigenvalues in the direction of Qz=0 and Qx=0 must be negative.
This is verified when it holds that:
j

E >

pj
eC j − 1

with j = N, S

(8)

whereas the eigenvalues are strictly positive iff the opposite of (8) holds. To
the right hand side of this inequality we have the ratio of the positive private effect
of the technology over its cost of adoption, which we may interpret as its efficiency
in region j. We note that the denominator is strictly positive since C j > 0. To
the left hand side we have the autonomous environmental quality in j, which also
coincides with the overall environmental quality since no agent is adopting strategy
A (x = 0, z = 0). Condition (8) thus requires that in both regions the efficiency
of the technology is lower than the environmental quality.
Stability of the stationary state (0, 1) In this case, only agents in S adopt
the technology, while no agent does so in N . We now have that the eigenvalue in
direction of Qz=1 of the Jacobian matrix (7), evaluated at (0, 1), is strictly negative
iff:
pN
N
E − f N > CN
(9)
e −1
whereas it is strictly positive iff the opposite of (9) holds. We note that this
condition is similar to condition (8), but we now have that the autonomous environmental quality is adjusted by the public effect of the agents in S adopting
strategy A (since z = 1). In other terms, in order for the agents in N to be more
convenient not to adopt the technology, its efficiency needs to be lower than the
overall environmental quality, which includes the public effects of agents in S. We
remark that environmental quality in this case can be either lower or higher than
in the non-adoption scenario, since the public effect can be either positive or negative; condition (9) can thus be either less or more restrictive than (8), respectively.
As concerns the eigenvalue in direction of Qx=0 , it is strictly negative iff:
S

E − dS <

pS
eC S − 1

(10)

whereas it is strictly positive iff the opposite of (10) holds. In order for agents in
11
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S to adopt the technology, its efficiency needs to be greater than the environmental
quality, which includes the domestic public effect dS .
Stability of the stationary state (1, 0) This case is specular to the previous
one, with all agents in N adopting the technology and no agent adopting it in
S. We find that the eigenvalue in direction of Qz=0 of the Jacobian matrix (7),
evaluated at (1, 0), is strictly negative iff:
pN
E − d < CN
e −1
N

N

(11)

whereas it is strictly positive iff the opposite of (11) holds. This condition
states that all agents in N adopt strategy A only if its efficiency is greater than the
environmental quality adjusted by the domestic public effect dN . The eigenvalue
in direction of Qx=1 is strictly negative iff:
pS
E − f > CS
e −1
S

S

(12)

whereas it is strictly positive iff the opposite of (12) holds. Agents in S do not
adopt strategy A only if its efficiency is lower than their environmental quality,
adjusted by the foreign public effect f S .
Stability of the stationary state (1, 1) Finally, this case represents a full
adoption scenario, in which all agents from both regions adopt the technology. We
have that the eigenvalues in direction of Qz=1 and Qx=1 of the Jacobian matrix
(7), evaluated at (1, 1), are strictly negative iff:
j

E − (dj + f j ) <

pj
eC j − 1

with j = N, S

(13)

whereas they are strictly positive iff the opposite of (13) holds. On the left
hand side of condition (13) we see that now the environmental quality is affected
by both domestic and foreign public effects, since all agents are adopting A. The
condition requires the efficiency of the technology for both regions to be greater
than the environmental quality.
12
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Finally, we remark that the vertices of Q can be simultaneously attractive,
which occurs when the following condition holds:
pj
pj
j
j
+
f
<
+ dj
E
<
eC j − 1
eC j − 1

with j = N, S

(14)

We note that in order for condition (14) to hold, it is necessary that f j < dj
for j = N, S. By checking their definitions in (2), we can see that this implies that
foreign public effects must be lower than domestic public effects, in both N and
S. If foreign public effects were stronger than domestic ones in at least one region,
then the stationary states (0, 1) and (1, 0) could not be simultaneously attractive.
Indeed, it would not be otherwise convenient for an agent not to adopt strategy A
when all agents in the other region are doing so unless foreign public effects were
neglectable with respect to domestic ones.
Some examples of multistability are shown in Figures 1–5, where attractive
stationary states are represented by full dots •, repulsive ones by open dots ◦, and
saddles by squares . In all cases graphically represented, agents in each region
coordinate on one of the two strategies. The most interesting dynamics of this kind
is the one represented in Figure 1, where condition (14) is satisfied. In this case
all vertices of Q are attractive, whereas all other stationary states along the sides
of Q are saddle points and the stationary state inside Q is a source. As Figure 1
shows, almost every trajectory4 will lead to a vertex of Q, where each region ends
up choosing a single strategy (either adopting the environmental maladaptation
technology or not). The basins of attraction of the vertices are delimited by the
stable manifolds of the saddle point in the interior of the sides of Q.
4

The stable branches of the saddles are exceptions, as they lead the system toward the saddle
point, which is stationary.
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= 0

= 0




= 0


= 0









Figure 1: All nine stationary states
exist: the vertices are attractors, the
ones on the sides are saddles and the
internal one is a repulsor.

2.3







Figure 2: In this case, there are
three attractors: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1),
whereas the other stationary states
are either repulsors or saddles.

Well-being analysis

We will now examine the average level of well-being in the two regions when all
public effects are negative, i.e. the coefficients are positive: dN , dS , f S , f N > 0.
The average level of well-being in N and in S is equal to the weighted average of
the well-being of agents adopting strategy A and the well-being of agents adopting
N A, where the weights are given by share of adopters in the region. Formally, we
have that:
N
e N (x, z) := x · ΠN
Π
(15)
A (x, z) + (1 − x) · ΠN A (x, z)
e S (x, z) := z · ΠSA (x, z) + (1 − z) · ΠSN A (x, z)
Π

(16)

e N (0, z) = ΠN (0, z) represents the average well-being in N when
so that Π
NA
e N (1, z) = ΠN (1, z) represents
no agent is adopting A in this region, whereas Π
A
the opposite case. The interpretation is analogous for region S. The following
proposition applies:

14
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= 0

= 0








= 0





= 0





Figure 3: In this case only the stationary states (0, 0) and (1, 0) are attractors. The stationary state in the
interior of the top side of Q is a repulsor whereas the one lying in the
interior of the botom side is a repulsor.





Figure 4: There are two attractors,
corresponding to the full adoption
(1, 1) and the non-adoption (0, 0) scenarios. There are also a saddle point
on the right hand side and a repulsor
in the asymmetric state (0, 1).

Proposition 2 If dN , dS , f S , f N > 0, then:
(a) for agents in N , the non-adoption stationary state (0, 0) Pareto-dominates all
other stationary states in Q, when they exist, with 0 ≤ x < 1 and 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
e N (0, 0) > Π
e N (x, z) for every (x, z) 6= (0, 0) with x and z such
Equivalently, Π
that 0 ≤ x < 1 and 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
(b) for agents in S, the non-adoption stationary state (0, 0) Pareto-dominates all
other stationary states in Q, when they exist, with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ z < 1.
e S (0, 0) > Π
e S (x, z) for every (x, z) 6= (0, 0) with x and z such
Equivalently, Π
that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ z < 1.
(c) for agents in both regions N and S, the non-adaptation stationary state (0, 0)
Pareto-dominates also the full adoption stationary state (1, 1) when the efficiency of strategy A, net of domestic public effects, is lower than local aue j (0, 0) > Π
e j (x, z) for every
tonomous environmental quality. Equivalently, Π
j
j
j
, with j = N, S.
(x, z) 6= (0, 0) when E > epC−d
j
−1
15
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= 0





= 0





= 0


= 0




Figure 5: In this case, the vertices (0, 1) and (1, 1) are attractors,
whereas a repulsor lies on the interior of the bottom side of Q.







Figure 6: There exist a global attractor, corresponding to the full adoption scenario (1, 1). There is alsoa
repulsor in the interior of the bottom
side of Q.

By the above proposition, and by virtue of section 2.2, it is easy to check that
when the stationary state (0, 0) is locally attractive, then it Pareto-dominates
all others. Furthermore, the non-adoption stationary state (0, 0) may Paretodominate the stationary state (1, 1) (in both regions) even if (1, 1) is the only
N
S
attractive stationary state (see Figure 6), provided that E and E are sufficiently
high. In such case, the adoption of maladaptation technologies in both regions
reduces the well-being of agents as system moves from the repulsive non-adoption
state (0, 0) to the attractive full adoption state (1, 1). One could also check that
if (0, 0) does not Pareto-dominate all other stationary states (in both N and S),
then the dynamics (5) is trivial, i.e. ẋ and ż are always positive in Q. In such
case, the stationary state (1, 1) is globally attractive and Pareto-dominates any
other possible state (x, z) in N and S.
Remark From the well-being analysis above, in the context represented in Figure 1, every agent, from each region, achieves its highest level of well-being in
(0, 0). Therefore, only one of the four attractive vertices yields the maximum level
of well-being. Furthermore, the lowest level of well-being is achieved in (1, 1),
16
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whereas intermediate levels are reached in (0, 1) and (1, 0).

2.4

Environmental dumping

At the centre of debates of both environmental and development economists, environmental dumping is the phenomenon for which an economic activity in an
industrialised country results in the disproportionate degradation of the environment of a developing country. Some scholars even argued that policies targeted to
improve environmental quality in industrialised countries lead to increased pollution in developing ones. For instance, scholars investigating the Pollution Haven
Effect5 maintain that carbon taxes and stricter environmental regulation are a
push factor for firms, which offshore to developing countries with laxer environmental institutions. Opponents of this theory argue that international trade and
offshoring incentivise developing countries to raise their environmental standards
and thus help tackling the problem of environmental degradation. The analysis of
the North American Free Trade Agreement performed by Gallagher (2000) seems
to partly support both claims: Mexican firms reduced their emission intensity following the agreement, yet overall emissions increased due to the relatively lower
Mexican standards with respect to the US ones. Since CO2 emissions are a public
bad (their negative effects affect the whole world), this increased pollution might
have damaged industrialised countries, as well.
We here investigate this hypothesis, for which shifting environmental burden
from one country to the other might worsen the well-being of all agents. More
precisely, our model allows to study the adoption dynamics of an environmental
maladaptation technology with negative public effects and which asymmetrically
degrades the environmental quality indicator of one of the two regions. We here
discuss what happens when an exogenous factor (e.g. a new policy) raises the
foreign effect f S in S, whereas it decreases domestic effect dN in N . This is the case
of a green tax or policy in the industrialised region which decreases the domestic
effect on the local resource but increases the foreign effect on the resource of the
other region, further degrading it. By means of a simple comparative dynamics
5

See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a definition of the concept and its differences with the
slightly similar Pollution Haven Hypothesis.
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https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1273

18

Antoci et al.: Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies with

Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies
analysis, we note that a smaller value of dN improves the environmental quality
in N and decreases the well-being differential of adopters of the maladaptation
technology. Since the foreign effect f S on the local environmental indicator of S
is greater, the environmental degradation of agents in S is greater, and the wellbeing differential of the adopters increases and leads more agents to adopt the
maladaptation technology. The overall well-being effects for agents in N cannot
be assessed a priori. If the reduction in the domestic effect dN is sufficiently large,
it might counterbalance the additional degradation deriving from more adopters in
the S region, who emit the foreign effect f N affecting the environmental quality in
region N . Vice versa, if the domestic effect is weaker with respect to the increased
adoption induced in the foreign region, then the well-being of N decreases as a
consequence of the exogenous change.
A graphical illustration is provided by Figures 1 and 5. In the former figure, we
recall that the non adoption state (0, 0) is Pareto-dominant. However, a change
in the value of f S may cause the stationary states (0, 0) and (1, 0) to become
unstable (see section 2.2), giving rise to the dynamic regime represented in Figure
5. In this case, the Pareto-dominant state (0, 0) would no more be an attractor,
and the system would lose its social optimum. By contrast, the Pareto-dominated
state (1, 1) would still be attractive. This analysis highlighted that environmental
policies in an industrialised region may have either a positive or a negative effect
for its agents, depending on the feedback effects of agents in the developing region.

3

Technologies with positive public effects

We now study the case in which all public effects of the environmental adaptation technology are positive, that is: dN , dS , f S , f N < 0. This case describes
the adoption dynamics of a mitigation technology, which thus improves environmental quality for all agents (see Gupta and Gregg, 2012; Hallegatte, 2009, for
instances of adaptation technologies with mitigation features). If we think of the
agents as firms, instances of such technologies might be the installation of a water
treatment plant on a common water basin or, equivalently, of a technology which
reduces emissions or waste water usage. Other examples might draw from busi18
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nesses dealing with the management of common environmental resources, such as
fisheries or forestries (Olson, 1965).

3.1

Dynamic regimes

We first note that if dN , dS , f S , f N < 0, both the straight lines (6a) (where
ẋ = 0) and (6b) (where ż = 0) have negative slope. Differently from the case with
negative public effects, in this case ẋ > 0 below line (6a), whereas ẋ < 0 above
it. Analogously, ż > 0 below line (6b), whereas ż < 0 above it. In contrast to the
previous case, now the adoption dynamics is not self-reinforcing: more specifically,
the incentive to adopt the environmental mitigation technology decreases if the
share of agents adopting the technology in either group increases. This is the well
known free riding problem, for which agents are not willing to contribute to a public
good and would rather benefit from the contributions of others without paying the
cost of their own contribution. In addition, the concavity of the well-being function
with respect to the environmental quality accentuates the effect, as it makes any
further improvement of the environment less desirable. Since the returns from
the mitigation technology decrease with the share of adopters while the cost is
constant, we may see why this context favours coexistence between strategies A
and N A. Indeed, as more and more agents adopt the mitigation technology,
the well-being differential of such strategy falls to zero, allowing for a stationary
state in which in the same region there are agents adopting strategy A and agents
adopting N A. Moreover, we remark that if the autonomous environmental quality
E is sufficiently high in N and S, then the well-being differential is always negative,
i.e. ẋ < 0 and ż < 0, leading agents to drop the mitigation technology and shift
from A to N A. In this case, the autonomous level of environmental quality is so
high that no agent finds it convenient to increase it further by an amount equal
to the private effect pj , with j = 0, 1. This might also be due to the inefficiency of
j
the mitigation technology (a low value of eCpj −1 ). In formal terms, we may say that
lines (6a) and (6b) move downwards if the autonomous environmental quality for
N
S
region N or S is higher. For sufficiently high values of E and E or for sufficiently
low values of pN and pS , we have that ẋ < 0 and ż < 0, respectively. The reverse
N
S
applies when E and E are sufficiently low or pN and pS sufficiently high.
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We find that the following proposition characterises the adoption dynamics
when: dN , dS , f S , f N < 0.
Proposition 3 Under the assumption that dN , dS , f S , f N < 0, the system 5 has
the following features:
(a) Every trajectory of the system approaches a stationary state.
(b) When the stationary state (0, 0) is attractive (see section 2.2), then it is globally
attractive, i.e. there is no other attractive stationary state (see Figure 7).
(c) When the stationary state (1, 1) is attractive (see section 2.2), then it is globally
attractive (see Figure 8).
(d) If there is no stationary state in the interior of Q, then there exists only one
attractive stationary state in the boundary of Q; it may either be one of the
vertices or lie on the interior of the edges of Q.
= 0




= 0





= 0












= 0

Figure 7: The non-adoption stationary state (0, 0) is globally attractive,
whereas the full adoption one (1, 1)
is repulsive.

Figure 8: The full adoption stationary state (1, 1) is globally attractive,
whereas the non-adoption one (0, 0)
is repulsive.

(e) If dN dS − f N f S > 0, i.e. the domestic effects are larger than the foreign ones,
the stationary state in the interior of Q (in which both strategies are played in
both regions) is globally attractive, when it exists (see Figure 9).
20
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(f ) If dN dS − f N f S < 0, i.e. the domestic effects are smaller than the foreign
ones, the stationary state in the interior of Q is a saddle point, when it exists.
In addition, there exist two attractive stationary states lying in the edges of
Q: they may be the vertices (0, 1) and (1, 0) or lie in the interior of the edges
Qh,k (see Figures 10–13).
(g) If pN = pS = 0 (i.e. the private effect of strategy A is 0 in both regions),
N
then non-adoption is individually convenient for all agents: ΠN
N A > ΠA and
ΠSN A > ΠSA , whatever the values of x and z are. This implies that ẋ < 0 and
ż < 0 always hold and consequently (0, 0) is globally attractive (the classical
free-riding problem arises for public goods provision).
RemarkThe coordinates of the internal stationary state are:
 N
dS E −
x=

z=



pN
C
e N −1
dN dS

 S
− fN E −

− f Sf N
 S
 N

S
dN E − eCpS −1 − f S E −

pS
C
e S −1



pN
C
e N −1



(17a)

(17b)

dN dS − f S f N
= 0

= 0




= 0




= 0







Figure 9: The internal steady state
is an attractor. There are also three
saddles on the sides and three repulsors on the vertices (0, 0), (1, 0),
(1, 1).







Figure 10: The internal point is
a saddle, whereas the asymmetric
states (0, 1) and (1, 0) are attractors.
The non-adoption state (0, 0) and the
full adoption one (1, 1) are repulsors.

21

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1273

22

Antoci et al.: Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies with

Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies
Thus, if dN /f N > f S /dS , i.e. the stationary state is attractive, the internal
stationary state exists if and only if:

N
0<d E −
S

N

0<d



pN
eC N − 1

pS
E − CS
e −1
S


−f



N



pS
E − CS
e −1



pN
eC N − 1



S


N
−f
E −
S

< dN dS − f S f N

< dN dS − f S f N

which can be rewritten as:




pS
pN
S
N
N
S
f
< d E − CN
< dN dS − f S f N
E − CS
e −1
e −1

N
f
E −
S

pN
eC N − 1




S
E −
<d
N

pS
eC S − 1



< dN dS − f S f N

These conditions require both numerator and denominator of coordinates (17)
to be positive, with the former being greater than the latter. The condition that
the numerators of (17) be lower than the related denominators restricts x̄ and z̄
to be lower than 1, thus making the point (x̄, z̄) belong to the interior of Q.
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= 0








= 0

= 0

= 0








Figure 11: The internal fixed point is
a saddle and both the non-adoption
(0, 0) and the full adoption (1, 1)
states are repulsors. Two attractors
lie on the interiors of the bottom side
and on the top side of Q.

3.2





Figure 12: The internal fixed point is
a saddle and both the non-adoption
(0, 0) and the full adoption (1, 1)
states are repulsors. Two attractors
lie on the interiors of side to the left
and on the side to the right of Q.

Well-being in the context with positive externalities

We now examine the average level of well-being in the two regions when all public
effects are positive: dN , dS , f S , f N < 0 (see (15) and (16) in the previous section
for a comparison). The following proposition applies.
Proposition 4 Assume dN , dS , f S , f N < 0. In such context, it holds:
(a) The stationary state (0, 0) is Pareto-dominated (in both regions) by any attractive stationary state with x > 0 and/or z > 0. When (0, 0) is attractive6 ,
it may be Pareto-dominated by other stationary states 7 .
(b) The stationary state (1, 1) Pareto dominates (in both regions) any other stationary state when it is attractive (remember that, in such case, no other stationary state can be attractive). Furthermore, even if it is unstable, it Pareto
dominates the stationary state in the interior of Q, when it exists.
6

As stated in Proposition 3, point (b), in this case (0, 0) is globally attractive.
N
N
N
S
N
S
−f N
and eCpS −1 < E <
This occurs, for instance, when eCpN −1 < E < p e−d
C N −1
hold. Indeed, in this case (0, 0) is attractive but is Pareto-dominated by (1, 1).
7

pS −dS −f S
eC S −1
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= 0


= 0








Figure 13: In this case, one attractor lies on the asymmetric state (0, 1)
and another lies on the interior of the
right-hand of square Q. The internal
point is a saddle and both the nonadoption (0, 0) and the full adoption
(1, 1) states are repulsors.

Remark From the well-being analysis above, in the context in which the stationary state (x, z) in the interior of Q is attractive, we have that (x, z) Paretodominates (0, 0) but is Pareto-dominated by (1, 1); however, the latter stationary
state cannot be reached because it is not attractive.
These results are reversed with respect to the case with negative public effects. Indeed, in the previous case (0, 0) Pareto-dominates all stationary states in
most cases, although it is not attractive. The selfish nature of the maladaptation
technology leads agents towards adoption, although it results in a lower level of
well-being for all. The technology is thus over-adopted with respect to the Paretooptimum. With positive public effects, we have that (0, 0) is Pareto-dominated by
all other stationary states whereas (1, 1) Pareto-dominates them when it is attractive. All agents benefit from the mitigation technology adopted by others, but they
are less willing to pay its cost as they do not internalise the well-being of other.
In this case, the technology is under-adopted, as the full adoption scenario would
be the Pareto optimum. This last result is in line with the results by Shogren and
Crocker (1991).

4

Discussion and conclusions

In this work, we excluded altruistic consideration on the part of agents towards
either same-region and cross-region agents. In other terms, we assumed that the
24
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actions of agents are only driven by self-interest considerations. We then studied the case of two regions whose agents may adopt an environmental adaptation
technology which yields a private benefit to the adopter, while also transferring a
negative or positive externality both to agents in the same region and to agents
in the other one. We defined same-region externalities as domestic public effects
and cross-region externalities as foreign public effects. The model here proposed
is very broad, so that a complete analysis of all possible specifications is beyond
the scope of this chapter. Instead, we focused on two salient characterisations.
On the one hand, we analysed the case of a maladaptation technology, whose
domestic and foreign public effects are both negative. In this case, an adopter
shifts the environmental load to agents from both regions. A common example
of this kind of technologies is air conditioning (Lundgren and Kjellstrom, 2013).
On the other hand, we analysed the case of a mitigation technology, whose domestic and foreign public effects are both positive. In this case, each adopter is
improving the well-being of agents from both regions. In analogy with the previous example, we may think of home insulation, as it allows each household to
reduce both heating and air conditioning, benefiting the environment on a global
scale. Our results show that for the maladaptation technology the social optimum
is represented by the non-adoption scenario, unless the efficiency of the technology
is extremely high (greater than the autonomous level of environmental quality).
However, Pareto-dominated states may be reached, because agents do not internalise the externalities of the technology. In this case, we talk of over-adoption of
the maladaptation technology. The reverse occurs with a mitigation technology,
which would have a full adoption scenario as its Pareto-optimum. However, an
intermediate state (in which only some agents are adopters) is typically reached,
since the returns on adoption decrease for each additional adopter. Also in this
case, agents do not take into account the (positive) externalities of adoption on
other agents, this time leading to under-adoption of the technology with respect to
the Pareto-dominant state. Finally, under the hypothesis of a maladaptation technology, with negative public effects, we analysed the effects of an environmental
dumping strategy. This represents a stronger characterisation of maladaptation,
as it requires that in the more developed region both the domestic and the foreign public effect are relatively low (null, in the extreme case) with respect to the
25
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public effects in the less developed region. Although it is intuitive that the agents
from the less developed region would be worse off in this case, the implications for
agents from the more developed region are not straightforward. Indeed, according
to relative magnitude of foreign effects in the two regions, the well-being of agents
from the more developed region could either increase or decrease.
This last result is particularly interesting, although its plausibility should be
verified by further research. Indeed, instances of such negative feedbacks could
provide greater insight on the cost-benefit analysis of many maladaptation strategies available to the more developed regions. In addition, further research should
try to map the specifications which are not illustrated in this work. Interesting dynamics could arise, for example, if the public effects had different signs according
to whether they are domestic or foreign. In particular, a case in which all domestic
public effects are null or positive, while all foreign effects are negative would depict
a situation in which all adopters shift the environmental burden to foreign agents,
although they increase the well-being of same-region individuals. In this case, it
is not intuitive which state the system would reach. Another relevant case would
be represented by technological differences between the two regions allowing the
agents from the more developed region to adopt a mitigation technology, whereas
agents in the less developed region could only adopt a maladaptation technology.
Well-being analysis could highlight which region is relatively more affected by the
negative externalities and which state is more likely to be reached. All similar
research directions, focusing on translating real phenomena and dynamics into the
model, would provide a fine extension to this work and a contribution to the understanding of the relationship between regions and countries at different stages
of development and their environmental quality.
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A

Proofs of the propositions in text

Proof of Proposition 1 The proof of point (b) is straightforward and follows
immediately from the local stability analysis (which can be found in Mathematical Appendix B). To prove point (a) we have to show that limit cycles
cannot exist (see e.g. Lefschetz, 1963, pp. 230 ff). This is obviously the case
when the internal stationary state (x, z), with 0 < x, z < 1, does not exist or,
if it does, is a saddle point. If (x, z) is a source, then dN dS − f S f N > 0 (see
(22) in appendix B, that is the straight line (6a) (where ẋ = 0) crosses from
above the straight line (6b) (where ż = 0). In such case, it is easy to see that
the regions in Q where ẋ and ż have the same sign are positively invariant, so
that no oscillatory behaviour of trajectories can occur. This implies, by the
Poincaré-Bendixson Theorem, that any trajectory starting in Q approaches
a stationary state. This concludes the proof of the proposition.

Proof of Proposition 2 To prove point (a) of proposition 2, we have to show
that the average payoff in N , evaluated at (0, 0), is higher than at any point
(x̄, z̄) along the line ∆ΠN (x, z) = 0 (where ẋ = 0) and along the side Qx=0 .
The average level of well-being in (0, 0) is:
e N (0, 0) = ΠN (0, 0) = ln E N
Π
NA

Let us now take a point (x̄, z̄) ∈ ∆ΠN (x, z) = 0 . We have that both
N
strategies yield the same level of well-being: ΠN
A (x̄, z̄) = ΠN A (x̄, z̄), which
implies:
 N

N
N
N
N
e
Π (x̄, z̄) = ΠN A (x, z̄) = ln E − d · x − f · z̄
e N (0, 0) > Π
e N (x̄, z̄). This
Therefore, if x̄ and/or z̄ > 0, it follows that: Π
means that the average well-being in the non-adoption state (0, 0) is higher
than in any stationary state in the interior of Q and in any stationary state
in the interior of the sides Qz=h (h = 1, 2). Furthermore, it is easy to check
that (0, 0) always Pareto-dominates any stationary state with z > 0 in the
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side Qx=0 . In order to prove point (c), we now show that (0, 0) ParetoN
N
N
dominates any stationary state in the side Qx=1 if E > peC N−d−1 . It can
be easily verified that (1, 0) always Pareto-dominates any other stationary
state in the side Qx=1 . Therefore, we simply have to compare well-being in
(0, 0) with the one in (1, 0). By very simple computations, we obtain that, if
N
N
N
E > peC N−d−1 , then (0, 0) Pareto-dominates (1, 0). With similar arguments,
it is easy to check that (1, 1) is Pareto-dominated by all the other stationary
N
N
N
states when E > peC N−d−1 . To prove that analogous results hold for the
well-being of region S, it suffices to apply the same arguments.
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof of point (b) is straightforward and follows
immediately from graphical analysis: if (0, 0) is attractive, then it must lie
above the straight lines (6a) and (6b). Consequently, in the interior of Q,
it holds ẋ < 0 and ż < 0, which implies the global attractiveness of (0, 0).
With similar arguments, point (c) can be proved. In order to prove point (e),
it suffices to check that when dN /f N > f S /dS , the internal stationary state
is locally attractive (see Proposition 6). Graphical analysis then allows to
see that no other attractive stationary state can exist. It remains to show
that limit cycles cannot exist. To do so, we note that the straight line (6a),
along which ẋ = 0, crosses the straight line (6b), along which ż = 0, from
above. In such case, the regions of Q where ẋ and ż have opposite signs are
positively invariant; this implies that no oscillatory behaviour of trajectories
may occur and consequently that the internal stationary state is globally
attractive by the Poincaré-Bendixson Theorem. We now prove point (f): if
dN /f N < f S /dS , the internal stationary state is a saddle point (see section
2.2); consequently, no limit cycle may exist. Furthermore, we note that the
straight line (6a) crosses the straight line (6b) from below. In such case,
the regions of Q where ẋ and ż have opposite sign are positively invariant
and, in each of these regions, the trajectories approach a stationary state
lying on the boundary of Q. Finally, the proof of points (a), (d) and (g) is
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4 To prove point (a) of the proposition, we first consider
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the average well-being in N , which in (0, 0) is equal to:
N
e N (0, 0) = ΠN
Π
N A (0, 0) = ln E

Let us now consider a point (x̄, z̄) ∈ Q. If (x̄, z̄) is a stationary state belongN
ing to the curve ∆ΠN (x, z) = 0, then it holds that ΠN
A (x̄, z̄) = ΠN A (x̄, z̄),
and consequently we have:
 N

N
N
N
N
e
Π (x̄, z̄) = ΠN A (x̄, z̄) = ln E − d · x̄ − f · z̄
Therefore, since dN , dS , f S , f N < 0, if either x̄ or z̄ > 0, we have that:
e N (0, 0) < Π
e N (x̄, z̄). Thus, average payoff in (0, 0) is lower than in any
Π
stationary state in the interior of Q and in any stationary state in the interior
of the sides Qz=k (k = 1, 2). Furthermore, it is easy to check that (0, 0) is
always Pareto-dominated by any stationary state in the side Qx=0 . It remains
to prove that (0, 0) is Pareto-dominated by any attractive stationary state in
e N (0, 0) < Π
e N (1, 1)
the side Qx=1 . Easy algebraic manipulations show that Π
N
N
N
N
−f
. The latter condition is always satisfied if
if and only if E < p e−d
C N −1
(1, 1) is attractive (see section 2.2). In the same way, it can be checked that
e N (0, 0) < Π
e N (1, 0) when (1, 0) is attractive. Finally, it is left to prove that
Π
(0, 0) is Pareto-dominated by any attractive stationary state (1, z) lying in
the interior of Qx=1 . As already seen above, the well-being in (0, 0) is lower
e N (0, 0) = ΠN (0, 0) < ΠN (1, z̄).
than in any stationary state, so that Π
NA
NA
Furthermore, we note that if (1, z) is attractive, then the curve ∆ΠN (x, z) =
0 must lie on the right of it (see Proposition 5); consequently, on the left of
∆ΠN (x, z) = 0, it holds that ∆ΠN (x, z) > 0. This implies that ΠN
N A (1, z̄) <
N
eN
eN
eN
ΠN
A (1, z̄). Therefore, Π (0, 0) < Π (1, z̄), being Π (1, z̄) = ΠA (1, z̄). The
corresponding results for S can be proved following the same steps. To
check the remaining part of point (a), we simply have to solve the inequality
e N (0, 0) < Π
e N (1, 1) and draw from the stability results in section 2.2 about
Π
the stationary state (0, 0). The proof of point (b) follows very similar steps.
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B

Stability properties of the stationary states

We here study the stability of the stationary states beyond the vertices of the
region Q, in order to understand toward which the system may converge. Indeed,
the attractive states are of particular interest, as they are the only states that can
actually be reached by the system. We recall that the condition for a stationary
state to be attractive is that both the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated
on it are negative8 .

B.1

Stability properties of the stationary states in the interior of the edges of Q

The following proposition concerns the stability properties of the stationary states
belonging to the interior of the edges of the square Q, i.e. those where both
adoption choices coexist in N while all agents in S play the same strategy or vice
versa.
Proposition 5 The Jacobian matrix of the system (5) evaluated at the stationary
states in the interior of the edges Qx=h (h = 0, 1) is:
(1 − 2h)∆ΠN (h, z)
S

z(1 − z) ∂∆Π∂x(h,z)

!

0

(18)

S

z(1 − z) ∂∆Π∂z(h,z)

where z is the value of z at the stationary state, and has the eigenvalues:
S
z(1 − z) ∂∆Π∂z(h,z) (in direction of Qx=h ) and (1 − 2h)∆ΠN (h, z) (in direction of the
interior of Q). The Jacobian matrix of the system (5) evaluated at the stationary
states in the interior of the edges Qz=h (h = 0, 1) is:
N

N

x(1 − x) ∂∆Π∂x(x,h) x(1 − x) ∂∆Π∂z(x,h)
0
(1 − 2h)∆ΠS (x, h)

!
(19)

where x is the value of x at the stationary state, and has the eigenvalues:
8

If the eigenvalues are both positive, then the state is repulsive and cannot be reached by
system (unless it coincides with its initial condition). If they have opposite signs, instead, the
state is a saddle and can only be reached if the initial condition of the system lies on its stable
branch.
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N

x(1 − x) ∂∆Π∂x(x,h) (in direction of Qz=h ) and (1 − 2h)∆ΠS (x, h) (in direction of
the interior of Q).
Proof. Straightforward.
We remark that, given a stationary state in an edge Qh=k , h = x, z and k = 0, 1,
the sign of its eigenvalue in direction of Qh=k is negative if and only if the stationary
states at the extrema of Qh=k which are the vertices of Q, have positive eigenvalues
in direction of Qh=k .
The conditions for the attractiveness of the steady states within the edges of
Q deserve further comment. Indeed, the attractiveness conditions (18) and (19)
require that:
∂∆ΠN (x, i)
<0
∂x
∂∆ΠS (i, z)
<0
∂z

(20a)
(20b)

Inequalities (20) describe a nonlinear dynamics of strategies A and N A in
N and S, respectively, similar to the “elitist”narratives in Antoci et al. (2018).
Since the well-being differential of adopting strategy A decreases with the share
of adopters, strategy A yields the highest payoffs when only a minority of agents
adopts it. As strategy A diffuses, so the incentive to adopt it decreases, to the point
that agents become indifferent toward the technology. Intuitively, the presence
of this dynamics in (only) one of the two regions is necessary in order to have
coexistence of strategies in such region and a pure population strategy in the
other region.

B.2

Stability properties of stationary states in the interior
of Q

The following proposition deals with the stability of stationary states in the interior
of the square Q, in which a positive share of agents adopts each strategy in both
regions.
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Proposition 6 The Jacobian matrix of the system (5) evaluated at a stationary
state (x, z) in the interior of Q (i.e. 0 < x, z < 1) is:
N

N

x(1 − x) ∂∆Π∂x(x,z) x(1 − x) ∂∆Π∂z(x,z)
S

z(1 − z) ∂∆Π∂x(x,z)

!

S

z(1 − z) ∂∆Π∂z(x,z)

(21)

where the sign of the determinant of (21) is equal to the sign of the expression:
dN dS − f S f N

(22)

and the trace of (21) is equal to:
S

N

dN (eC − 1)x(1 − x) + dS (eC − 1)z(1 − z)

(23)

Proof. Straightforward.
According to the above proposition, we have that if expression (22) is strictly
negative, then the internal stationary state is a saddle (i.e. it is unstable). If it
is positive, then the stationary state may be a source (i.e. a repulsor) or a sink
(i.e. an attractor). In the context in which expression (22) is strictly positive,
the condition dN , dS > 0 (< 0) is a sufficient condition for the repulsiveness
(attractiveness) of the internal stationary state. Moreover, if the determinant is
negative, then the stationary state is a saddle, whereas it is attractive when the
determinant is positive and the trace is negative. The trace is given by the sum:
x(1 − x)

∂∆ΠN (x, z)
∂∆ΠS (x, z)
+ z(1 − z)
∂x
∂z

This means that in order for the trace to be negative, at least one of the
partial derivatives above must be negative, meaning that in the corresponding
region strategy A has an elitist dynamics as previously defined.
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Deschênes, Olivier and Michael Greenstone (2011) “Climate change, mortality, and
adaptation: Evidence from annual fluctuations in weather in the US,” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 152–85.
Gallagher, Kevin (2000) Trade Liberalization and Industrial Pollution in Mexico:
Lessons of the FTAA, Vol. 00-07. Tufts University.
Geaun, Jerome C (1993) “On the shiftable externalities,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 25, pp. 30–44.
Glotzbach, Stefanie and Stefan Baumgartner (2012) “The relationship between intragenerational and intergenerational ecological justice,” Environmental Values,
Vol. 21, pp. 331–355.
Gupta, Rajat and Matthew Gregg (2012) “Using UK climate change projections
to adapt existing English homes for a warming climate,” Building and Environment, Vol. 55, pp. 20–42.
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